THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.
APRIL 1883.

WARRANTIES IMPLIED IN SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA.
(Continued from March No., page 168.)

IV.

GOODS SOLD TO ORDER.

WHERE goods are to be made or supplied to order, there is

always an implied warranty that they are reasonably fit for the
ordinary use to which such goods are usually put, and that they
are suitable for the special use intended by the purchaser, provided
that it be communicated to the vendor when the order is given to
him.
Thus, in Port Carbon Iron Co. v. Groves, 68 Penn. St. 149,
READ, J., said, quoting 1 Pars. on Cont. 586, "If a thing be
ordered of the manufacturer for a special purpose, and it be supplied and sold for that purpose, there is an implied warranty that it
is fit for that purpose. This principle has been carried very far. It
must, however, be limited to cases where a thing is ordered for a
ipecial purpose, and not applied to those where a special thing is
ordered, although this be intended for a special purpose."
So, in Spurr v. Albert M1ining Co., 2 Hannay (N. B.) 361,.
where the defendants had agreed to supply the plaintiffs with
Albert coal fiom their mines for the purpose of being made into
oil, the coal to be a good, clean coal, Held, the plaintiffs were
VoL. XXXI.-29
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entitled to receive coal of a fair merchantable quality. Here the
cases were very elaborately reviewed by RITCHIE, C. J., who also
thought the case could be put on the ground of a delivery of a
chattel other than that contracted for, and which the purchaser
was not bound to take, and not alone on the ground of the implied
warranty of fitness. See, also, Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114;
Wolcott v. itount, 7 Vroom 262. The same principle is further
illustrated by some of the cases about to be cited in the next subdivision.
V. SALE OF GoODS FOR SPECIAL UsE.

(a) Vrendor's skill relied upon..
It has always been held that where a man buys an article for a
special purpose, and makes known the intended use of the same to
the vendor, there is an implied warranty that the article is fit for
such use, provided the vendor's knowledge or skill is relied upon,
and the vendee does not buy on his own judgment alone.
In Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114, defendant sold to plaintiff a
lot of hay, and offered to let plaintiff examine the bay in his
barn; this the plaintiff declined to do, saying, he could not tell by
that, but he wished it for his oxen during spring and summer while
at work at a railroad, and defendant said it was good hay, cut
around the barn. On removing the covering, plaintiff found the
hay was worthless, and was not such as could be cut around the
barn. The court said, inter alia, "The hay was bought for a
particular use, and the defendant knew plaintiff would not buy an
inferior article. The sale of the hay then for this particular use,
ordinarily implies a certainty that it is fit for the use."
In Murray v. Smith, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 277, plaintiff sold certain
barrels of lampblack to the defendant, the latter saying ,he must
be very particular in having "black" that would make printers'
ink; that black for carriage use would be of no use; that he must
have lampblack for printing ink. The plaintiff knew defendant
was a manufacturer of printing ink, and he sold-the "black" to him
for that purpose. The barrels were not examined. Held, a warranty that the "black" should be suitable for the manufacture of
printing ink.
In Park v. Morris Axe and Tool Co., 4 Lansing (N. Y.) 103,
the plaintiffs, manufacturers of steel, at Pittsburgh, sold to the
defendants, manufacturers of axes, ten tons of steel. .eld, the
name of the defendants' firm was notice to plaintiffs of the use
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intended for the steel. MULLIN, P. J., said: "Parsons, in his
work on Contracts, vol. 1, p. 469, says: 'If a thing be ordered
of the manufacturer for a special purpose, and it be supplied and
sold for that purpose, there is an implied warranty that it is fit
for that purpose.' The plaintiffs were manufacturers, and the
defendants ordered the steel for the purpose of being made into
axes. The case is thus brought within the principle asserted by
Parsons. * * * The name of defendants' company was 'Axe
and Tool Company.' This was notice to plaintiffs of the uses to
which the steel was to be applied; and the warranty must be held
to be, that the steel would make either axes or tools, &c." See,
also, Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 424; Bartlett v. HloPpock, 34 N. Y. 118; County v. Wade, 12 Upper Canada Q. B.
614; Gilson v. Binghaa, 43 Vt. 41; Brown v. Jurphee, 31
Miss. 91.
In French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132, a party sold hay to plaintiff, on which white lead had been spilt, the plaintiff being ignorant
thereof, in consequence of which, when used by plaintiff for feeding
his cow, it caused death. On the trial of an action for damages
for the death of the cow, the judge ruled that "if the cow died in
consequence of eating the paint adhering to the hay sold by the
defendant, the plaintiff might recover, although the defendant did
not know or believe that there was paint upon the hay; and that
the defendant was bound to use the utmost care in separating the
paint from the hay so sold." AmEs, J.: "It may be perhaps
more accurate to say, that, independently of any express and
formal stipulation, the relation of the buyer to the seller may be
of such a character as to impose a duty upon the seller, differing
very little from a warranty. The circumstances attending the sale
may be equivalent to a distinct affirmation on his part as to the
quality of the thing sold. A grocer, for instance, who sells at
retail, may be presumed to have general notion of the uses which
his customers will probably make of the articles which they buy
of him. If they purchase flour or sugar or other articles of daily
domestic use for their families, or grain or meal for their cattle,
the act of selling to them under such circumstances is equivalent
to an affirmation that the things sold are at least wholesome and
reasonably fit for use; and proof that he knew, at the time of the
sale, that they were not wholesome and reasonably fit for use, would
be enough to sustain an action against him for deceit, if he had not
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disclosed the true state of the facts. The buyer has a right to
suppose that the thing which he buys, under such circumstances,
is what it appears to be, and such purchases are usually made with
a reliance upon the supposed skill or actual knowledge of the
vendor. In the case at bar, the plaintiff bought the hay in small
quantities, and the defendant must be considered as knowing. generally, the kind of use to which it was to be applied. The act of
sale, under such circumstances, was equivalent to an express assurance that the hay was suitable for such use."
In Rodgers et al. v. Niles et al., 11 Ohio St. 48, N. & Co.
agreed with R. & Co. to manufacture and deliver to the latter, at a
future time, three steam boilers to run the engines in their rolling
mills. Held, that there was an implied promise on the part of the
vendors that such boilers should be free from all such defects of
material and workmanship, latent or otherwise, as would render
them unfit for such use. In this case, SCOTT, J., considered at some
length the authorities on this subject. He said: "The general
rule of the common law undoubtedly is, that upon an executed
sale of specific goods, the vendor will not be held liable for any
defects in the quality of the articles sold, in the absence of fraud
or express warranty. Where the purchaser is not deceived by any
fraudulent representations, and demands no warranty, the law
presumes that he depends on his own judgment in the transaction,
and applies the maxim 'caveat emptor.' But to this general rule
the requirements of manifest justice have introduced sundry exceptions, of which some are as well settled as the rule itself, while, as
to others, the authorities cannot be easily reconciled. We do not
propose an investigation of the subject further than is demanded
by the case before us. The principal, if not the sole exceptions*
to the rule, are found in cases where it is evident that the purchaser did not rely on his own judgment of the quality of the
article purchased; the circumstances showing that no examination
was possible on his part, or the contract being such as to show that
the obligation was thrown upon the vendor, as where he agrees to
furnish an article for a particular purpose or use. Thus, it is said
by Mr. STORY, 'when

an examination of goods is, from their

nature or situation at the time of the sale impracticable, a warranty will in general be implied that they are merchantable. Thus,
if goods be at sea, or not arrived; or if they fill the hold of a
ship so that nothing but the surface can be seen ; or if they be in
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bales, so that an examination of the centre cannot be made with.
out tearing each bale to pieces; the seller will be understood to
warrant them merchantable, and of the quality demanded and
expected by the buyers:' Story on Cont., sec. 834.
"It is true that the warranty of merchantable quality has, in
several cases, been held to be limited to cases where the examination is impracticable,and not merely inconvenient: Hyatt v. Boyle,
So, also,
5 Gill & Johns. 110; Hart v. Wright, 17 Wend. 267.
the implication of warranty is said not to extend to cases where an
examination, though practicable, would be fruitless on account of
the latent character of the defects; but only to those cases in which
there can be no examination: 1 Pars. on Cont. 466. The same
writer, however, says, 'one exception to the rule of caveat emptor
springs from the rule itself. For a requirement that the purchaser
should 'beware,' or should take care to ascertain for himself the
quality of the thing he buys, becomes utterly unreasonable, under
The
such circumstances, which make such care impossible.'
vendor's liability on an implied warranty, in the case of articles
sold for a particular purpose, is illustrated by the cases of Jones v.
Bright, 5 Bing. 533; Brown v. Bdgington, 2 M. & G. 279;
Beales v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114; Brenton v. Davis, 8 Blackford
317. Other cases have imposed proper limitations on this doctrine,
as in the case of Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, and Ollivant
v. Bagley, 5 Q. B. 288. In these cases, it was held that where a
'known and ascertained article' is ordered and furnished, though
intended for a particular use, the liability of the maker and vendor
extends only to defects in the materials and workmanship, and not
to such as arise from the principle or mode of construction. With
respect to the doctrine that a sale made for a particular purpose,
implies a warranty that the thing sold shall be fit for that purpose, it is -said in 1 Smith's L. Cas. 250, that 'the sounder view
seems to be that no engagement of this sort can be implied against
the vendor, save where the contract is partially or wholly executory; and that in this case it is not in the nature of a warranty
but of an implied stipulation, forming part of the substance of the
contract.' And a marked distinction will be found to pervade all
the authorities, between an executed sale, where the property passes
in presenti, and an executory sale, for the delivery on a future day,
of an article not specifically defined or selected at the time. In
the latter case, it makes no difference whether the vendor have an
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article of the kind on hand, or it is afterward to be procured or
manufactured. In neither case can the promisee be compelled
to rest satisfied with an inferior article. Though, in the absence
of express stipulation, he cannot insist that the article shall be of
any special degree of fineness, yet he has a right to insist that it
shall be of medium quality or goodness, free from such defects as
would render it unmerchantable, or unfit for the purpose for which
it is ordinarily used: -Howardv. Hoey, 23 Wend. 351; Bown v.
Sayles, 27 Yt. 227; Story on Cont., sec. 834; Broom's Leg.
Maxims 614."
(b)Vendor's skill not relied upon.
.Dounce v. -Dow, 64 N. Y. 411, is an illustration of goods
sold by the vendor who knows the use for which they are intended,
but whose skill or peculiar knowledge is not relied upon by the
vendee. Here, defendants, manufacturers of agricultural implements, ordered of plaintiffs, dealers, but not manufacturers of pig
iron, "double X pipe iron." Plaintiff had no such iron in stock
but obtained it of a manufacturer, and shipped to defendants,
knowing the use for which it was intended. The iron was found
to be "double X pipe iron," but of very poor quality, and when
used for casting the castings were worthless. The court held that,
as defendants had kept for some time, and used the iron without
testing it, they could not rescind, and that a'sthe plaintiff's skill
was not relied upon in the purchase there was no implied warranty
of fitness for any purpose. MULLIN, 5., in the court below 6 T.
& 0. 653, said: "It is urged by defendants' counsel that upon
the facts proved, the court should have found that plaintiff warranted the iron to be suitable for making such castings as defendants were engaged in making. Plaintiff knew the use to which
defendants designed to put the iron when delivered, but that furnishes no ground for implying a warranty that the iron was
suitable for such use, as he did not manufacture it: Bartlett v.
.loppock, 34 N. Y. 118. It is unnecessary to inquire what the
rule of law would be if the plaintiff had been the manufacturer of
the iron and knew the use to which defendants designed to put it?
He is not shown to have skill in iron. He was a mere dealer in
the article, purchasing the various brands of iron and selling
them by the name by which they were known in the mirket, and
left the purchasers to ascertain the quality for themselves. No
I
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warranty is implied in such a case." The judgment was affirmel
on appeal. CHuRcH, 0. J., delivering the opinion, said: "If the
defendants had ordered double X pipe iron, which was tough and
soft, and fit for manufacturing agricultural implements, and the
plaintiffs had agreed to deliver iron of that quality, a warranty would
have been established, which, probably, within the case of Day v.
Pool, 52 N. Y. 416, would have survived the acceptance of the
article. Here, both parties acted in good faith. The defendants
ordered simply double X pipe iron, supposing that such iron was
always tough and soft. The plaintiff forwarded the iron under the
same impression. The iron proved to be brittle and hard, and the
question is which party is to bear the loss ?" (The opinion of the
court below is given in full in Dounce v. Dow, 6 Thomp. & Cook,
N. Y. S. 0. Rep. 653). In the above case, it will be seen
the vendor's skill was not relied on, but the vendee bought on his own
judgment. See also Calhoun v. Vechio, 3 Wash. 0. C. 165.
VI. IMPLIED WARRANTY

OF SOUNDNESS

IN SALES OF PRo-

VISIONS.

Mr. Benjamin, after a review of the English cases, in his work
on Sales (see. p. 666, 3d Amer. ed.), concludes that "it results
clearly from these authorities that the responsibility of a victualler,
vintner, brewer, butcher or cook, for selling unwholesome food,
does not arise out of any contract or implied warranty, but is a
responsibility imposed by statute, that they shall make good any
damage caused by their sale of unwholesome food."
In the. United States, in one of the earlier cases: Bailey v.
.Nickols, 2 Root (Conn.) 407 (1796), plaintiffs bought a quantity
of barrel beef for exportation, which was also properly marked by
the inspector. When the cargo arrived in the West Indies, the beef
was found to be tainted and unfit for sale, and the court held "that.
the defendant, by selling this beef for cargo beef, and asking and
receiving a sound price for it, did warrant it to be such as the law
prescribed under the denomination of cargo beef, and that it was
good and sound." This case, however, it will be seen, rea11y turned
on different principles, viz. : that a sound price implies a sound
article and the principle of merchantability; and the decision evidently had no special reference in principle to the particular kind
of article sold. And later, in .Dean v. Mason, 4 Conn. Rep. (1822)
428, the doctrine of sound article for a sound price was considered
as exploded.
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In New York, in the early case of Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12
Johns. (N. Y.) 468 (1815), on an action for damages for the
delivery of diseased beef-the animal having been slaughtered for
fear she should die a natural death-for domestic use, the court
said: "In 3 Blackst. Com., it is stated as a sound and elementary
propogition, that in contracts for provisions, it is always implied
that they are wholesome ; and if they are not, case lies to recover
damages for the deceit. In the sale of provisions for domestic use,
the vendor is bound to know that they are sound and wholesome at
his peril. This is a principle not only salutary, but necessary to
the preservation of health and life."
In this case, however, there was, as appears, positive evidence of
a fraudulent concealment, the animal being killed by the vendor to
prevent a natural death from disease. In the more recent case
of Blart v. Wright, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 267 (1837), CowEN, J.,
said of Van Bracklint v. Fonday : "I am not aware of any other
case in this state wherein a warranty of quality is engrafted on a
sound price alone."
In Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 378, BRONSON, C. J., considered at some length this proposition: "We are referred," said
he, "to the authority of Blackstone fbr another exception to the
general rule, and it is insisted that on a sale of proisions, there is
an implied warranty that they are wholesome. * * * The language
of the commentator leaves it somewhat doubtful whether his mind
was not upon a deceit in the sale, which stands on a different footing from a warranty. If he intended to affirm that the law implies
a warranty of soundness in the sale of provisions, the remark is
without any support in the English adjudications. * * * The

dictum of Blackstone has been directly overruled in Massachusetts
(.Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. Rep. 197). * * * The. doctrine
of Blackstone, with a very important qualification, was approved
by the judge who prepared the opinion in Van Bracklin v. Fonda,
12 Johns. 468, but that was plainly a case of fraud. The jury
found that the beef was unsound and unwholesome, auid that the
defendant-the seller-knew the animal to be diseased. The case
of Hart v. Wright, 17 Wend. 267, and 18 Id. 449, arose on a
sale of provisions; and one member of the Court of Errors was for
implying a warranty of soundness, but that opinion did not prevail. • *

* Although the doctrine of Blackstone cannot be

supported in its whole extent, I am not disposed to deny that on a
sale of provisions for immediate consumption, the vendor may be
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held responsible, in some form, for the sound and wholesome condition of the articles which he sells." Here, the provisions were
sold as merchandise, and the court said that no implied warranty
existed.
In lBurch v. Spencer et al., 22 N. Y. 504 (1878), plaintiff's
agent bought pork for food, of defendant, who denied the meat to be
that of a boar (which is not sold for food as meat, but for lard, &c.).
Here, the case again turned on the knowledge of the vendor, and
the court held there was a warranty, and added: "I believe that
this view of the case is in strict accordance with public policy,
which requires that only articles that are sound, wholesome and fit
for use shall knowingly be sold for food, and that in accordance
with, such policy, the law implies a warranty in all cases of an
executed contract of sale of articles of food that the same are
wholesome and fit for use as such, where the vendor has personal
knowledge of the quality and condition of the articles sold, not
known to the purchaser, and that the partypurchasing intends to
use the articles for food, or to sell them to others to be used for
the same purpose."
In Massachusetts, in -Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197,
SEWALL, J., stated the law thus: "Justice BLACKSTONmE has classed

the cases of deceit and breaches of express warranties in contracts
for sales under the head of implied contracts. He says: I In contracts for provisions it is always implied that they are wholesome;
and in a sale with warranty, the law annexes a tacit contract, that
if the article be not as warranted, compensation shall be made to
the buyer; * * * or if they be in any shape different from what he
represents them to be to the buyer, this artifice shall be equivalent
to an express warranty, and the vendor is answerable for their
goodness.' It is obvious that, in this very general classification,
the details and examples are very imperfectly introduced and with
some inaccuracy. It is not implied in every sale of provisions,
that they are wholesome, any more than it is in sales of other
articles, where proof of a distinct affirmation seems in Justice
BLACESTONE'S opinion to be requisite. The contrary may be, and
often is, understood between the parties; and it is only when the
false representations, to be proved in the one case, may be presumed
or taken to be proved in the other that the rule of law applies, and
the remedy, as in a case of deceit, is allowed. An artifice must be
proved to entitle the suffering party to the remedy, equivalent to a
VOL. XXXI.-30
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remedy upon an express warranty, as well in the case of provisions
as in any other case. The difference is, that in the case of provisions, the artifice is proved, when a victualler sells meat as fresh to
his customers at a sound price, which, at the time, was stale and
defective or unwholesome from the state in which the animal died.
For, in the nature of the bargain, the very offer to sell is a representation or affirmation of the soundness of the article when
nothing to the contrary is expressly stated; and his knowledge of
the falsehood in this representation is also to be presumed from the
nature and duties of his calling and trade. But, cases may be
supposed where, this presumption being repelled by contrary
evidence, the seller would not be liable; as where a different representation was made; and this is proved directly, or is necesgarily
to be presumed from the nature of the article, the state of the
market, or other circumstances. Indeed there is nothing to be
inferred in a sale of provisions, which may not be inferred to a like
purpose in other cases; where the calling or profession of the
seller, the soundness of the price, and nature of ihe article sold,
have been made the ground of decision." In Winsor v. Lombard,
18 Pick. (Mass.) 61, SUAw, C. J., observed: "It is supposed
that a different rule applies to the case of all provisions from that
applicable to other merchandise. This matter is well explained by
Mr. Justice SEWALL, in .Emerson v. BriqgTam, supra."
. In Howard v. -merson, 110 Mass. 320 (1872), a live cow was
sold to a retail butcher, for use as fbod, and it was held there
was no implied warranty that the cow was fit for food. MORTON,
J., in speaking of the exception, to the general rule contended for,
in the case of an article sold for domestic use, said: "But we
think that this exception, if established, does not extend beyond
the case of a dealer who sells provisions directly to the consumer
for domestic use. In such cases it may be reasonable to infer a
tacit understanding which enters into the contract, that the provisions are sound. The relation of the buyer to the seller, and the
circumstances of the sale, may raise the presumption that the seller
impliedly represents them to be sound. But the same reasons are
not applicable to the case of one dealer selling to another dealer."
In Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 495, there is a dictum
that in a sale of provisions there is a warranty.

In Pennsylvania, in JetNaughton v. Joy, 1 Weekly Notes of
Cases (Phila.) 470, the Court of Common Pleas held, on a sale
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of butter and potatoes for table use, there was always an implied
warranty that they were fit for the purpose for which they were
sold.
In Ryder v. Weitye, 21 Minn. 70, the court said, the warranty,
if implied at all, is implied only where the provisions are sold for
consumption, or immediate use by the vendee, and not as merchandise, as in this case. And in Goad v. Johnson, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.)
340 (1871), NiCHOLsoN, 0. J., after quoting, approvingly, Mr.
Benjamin's conclusion on this subject, in his work on Sales,
referred to above, repudiated the idea that the sale of provisions
affords any exception to the general rule of caveat emptor in sales,
and said: "The case of selling unwholesome provisions for consumption, therefore, furnishes no exception to the rule that where
there is no deceit or fraud on the part of the seller, and where the
buyer inspects and buys upon his own judgment, he buys subject
to the rule of caveat emptor, even if there were a latent defect in
the chattel sold, equally unknown to seller and buyer, and hidden
from detection by either."
In Humphrey v. Comline, 8 Blackf. (Ind.), 516, it was held that
in a sale of molasses in barrels, at the market price, to a grocer,
there was no implied warranty, the molasses was fit for the purpose
purchased, the barrels being present at the time of the sale, and
subject to inspection.
In Hyland v. Sherman, 2 E. D. Smith 238, WooDitu, J., said:
"As to the supposed warranty that the articles being provisions,
they were suitable for food, if it be true that any such warranty is
implied on a sale of food for domestic use, it has been distinctly
held that there is no such warranty when the provisions are sold
as merchandise, to be sold again by the buyer: Moses v. 2Uead,
sapra."

In Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 51, it was, however, held that in
a sale of provisions for immediate domestic use, a warranty of
soundness is implied. Here the court were not unanimous in their
opinion, and besides the court below was reversed.
Upon a review of these cases, we are led to conclude that there
is no good reason why, in a sale of provisions, the vendor should
be held to warrant the soundness of his goods any more than in
any other contract of sale, nor do any of the cases, we have been
able to find, except the cases of JfllcNaughton v. Joy, supra, and
Hoover v. Peters, supra, which are put on the supposed superior
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knowledge of the vendor, hold such a doctrine ; though the dicta
of some judges, perhaps, point that way. It is said by the annotator to the third edition of Benjamin on Sales, at page 665, that
"it has been held, that there is a very plain distinction between
selling provisions for 'domestic use,' and selling them as articles
of merchandise to one who does not intend to use them for immediate consumption but to sell again ; in tne latter case there is no
implied warranty." None of the cases he cites for this proposition,
however, in our opinion, bear him out, though certainly the dicta
of individual judges are to that effect, while some of the cases
cited by him even repudiate that doctrine altogether. In those
cases we have reviewed, in which a warranty has been implied, the
element of fraud, or superior knowledge on the part of the vendor,
has always been present. Circumstances may, of course, occur,
where a warranty may be presumed, from the nature of the sale, or
the surrounding circumstances of the parties at the time of the
sale, but we have found no case with the exception of Aelaughton
v. Joy, supra, and H~oover v. Peters, supra, which has flatly
decided that in a sale of provisions for domestic use or otherwise,
the law will imply a warranty of soundness, different from what
would be implied in the case of a sale of any other article.
VII.

WARRANTY IMPLIED FROM A USAGE OF TRADE.

A warranty is often implied from some familiar usage of the
trade prevalent at the' 'place where the parties deal; such usage,
however, must be shown to be in all respects reasonable, and have,
otherwise, the necessary qualifications of a valid usage, to be binding 'upon the parties. The following cases are illustrations of
usages that have been held valid:In Clark v. Baker, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 186, it was held that
evidence of a usage was admissible to prove that, in the port of
Boston, where a cargo of corn is sold in bulk, lying in the vessel in
which it was imported, and the sale is made under a warranty, the
purchaser receives it and retains so much as corresponds with
the contract, and rejects the residue, which thereupon is vested
in the seller. DEWEY, J., remarked: " The extent to which local
usages of trade are to be applied, in the construction and effect to
be given to contracts, is a matter by no means free from difficulty.
These usages differ essentially from those more general customs
which are known and exist as part of the general law of the land,
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and which are observed and applied without being offered in each
particular case. These local usages may be of comparatively
recent origin, and may be limited to a single city or village; and
yet, if reasonable in their provisions, and so ienerally adopted by
those concerned in any peculiar branch of business, as to authorize
the presumption that they are known by those who are dealing as
vendors and vendees in that branch of trade or business, the dealings and contracts of such persons are considered to have been
made with reference to such usages, and to be governed thereby.
Learned jurists have often expressed their regret at the extension
of this species of evidence, and especially that as to usage, of a local
and limited character, as impairing, in some degree, the symmetry
of the law, and tending to uncertainty and embarrassment in the
administration of justice, and also liable to the serious objection,
that the knowledge, by the party to be affected by it, of the existence of such usage, is a mere legal presumption which may often
be unfounded in reality, although such usage is established by
what is deemed competent legal evidence. Notwithstanding these
objections, such local usages have been held admissible by the
judicial tribunals, as -competent to explain and qualify the contract,
and give to it an effect materially different from that which the general
law Would have done, in the absence of all evidence of such usage."
In Snowden v. Warder, 3 Rawle (Penn.) 101, the court admitted
evidence of a usage at Philadelphia, that, on the purchase and sale
of cotton, the vendor shall answer the vendee for any latent defect
in the article sold, though there be no fraud, and in the absence
of any warranty.
In Boorman et al. v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 566, it was
held that evidence of a usage was admissible to show that, in a
certain locality, a sale of packed cotton is a sale by sample, though
the written evidence of the sale was silent in that respect; usage
being parol evidence admissible to explain, though not to contradict, the written instrument.
In FYatman v. Thompson, 2 Disney (Cinn.) 482, evidence was
offered to show an established usage among Cincinnati tobacco
dealers, to warrant, in all sales of a particular kind of tobacco, the
article as sound and merchantable for four months after the sale,
and on proof of its being the contrary, the seller to make a reduction in the price. Held, a reasonable usage. STORER, J., said:
"Whenever a usage of any particular trade or place is established
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to exist, the law, as we understand it, implies on the part of him
' who contracts or employs another to contract for him, upon a
matter to which such usage or custom has reference, a promise for
the benefit of the ther party, in conformity with such usage;
provided there be no express stipulation between them which isl
inconsistent with such usage.' * * * Its reasonableness must
depend in a great measure upon the place where the contract is
made, as well as upon the nature of the commodity sold. When
once established, it becomes the rule of the trade, and the dealer
in the article sold cannot protect himself by asserting his ignorance
of the usage."
In the following cases, the usages of the place or trade were
held, not reasonable, and therefore illegal:
In -Dodd v. 1iarlaw, 11 Allen (Mass.) 426, the court held, a
usage that gives a broker an implied authority to warrant goods
sold by him to be of a merchantable quality is inadmissible.
BIGELOW, 0. J., remarked: "It is liable to the grave objection
that it is unreasonable, and so contrary to the ordinary rules by
which the relation of principal and agent is regulated, that it cannot be presumed to have been in contemplation of a vendor in
employing a broker to make a sale of merchandise. Even if the
usage was known to the vendor, he would have a right to disregard
it, and to disavow a contract made in conformity to it."
In Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Penn. St. 448, an offer was made to
prove the existence of a custom of the trade at the port of Philadelphia, that soda ash is sold upon the representation of the seller
as to the percentage of alkali contained in it, and without warranty
or sample. Held, inadmissible. LowniE, J., said: "As to the
offer to prove a special custom in Philadelphia as to the special
article of soda, if it means anything at all, it means that, when
people in Philadelphia are selling soda, common English words of
representation become words of warranty. It must be conceded
that such evidence has been admitted (3 Rawle 101); but never
without serious doubts, and we have found ourselves unable to
follow the example. See Coxe v. Heisley, 7 Harris (Penn.) 243."
This case, it must be admitted, virtually overrules that of Snowden
v. Warder, supra, in which an able opinion was delivered by
Ross, J. It may, however, be remarked with reference to
Wetherill v. Neilson, supra, that the decision has been much
questioned.
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In Barnardv. Kellogg, 10 Wallace (U. S.) 383, Barnard, residing in Boston, placed a lot of wool, received from a shipper in
Buenos Ayres, in the hands of certain wool brokers to sell, with
instructions not to sell unless the purchaser came to Boston to
examine the wool for himself. The brokers sent to Kellogg & Co.,
at Hartford, Connecticut, samples of the lots of wool, and Kellogg
wrote in reply, naming a price, and offering to take the wool, if
equal to sample. The brokers accepted this offer, provided the
dealers in Hartford examined the wool, and stated whether they
would take it or not. Kellogg acceded to this condition, and
examined four bales in the brokers' office, and was offered an
opportunity to examine the whole, but this he declined to do.
Afterwards, it was discovered that the cotton was deceitfully packed
with rags and damaged wool, of which, however, Barnard was
ignorant. On the trial of the case, without a jury, the court held
this not to be a sale by -sample; and found that there was a
custom of merchants in Boston and New York, where such goods
are sold, by virtue of which a warranty is implied that the same
are not deceitfully packed, which custom the court held valid, and
binding on the parties to the sale. On appeal, this was reversed,
STRONG and BRADLEY, JJ., dissenting. DAVIS, J., said: "It is
apparent, that the usage in question was inconsistent with the
contract which the parties chose to make for themselves, and
contrary to the wise rule of law governing the sales of personal
property. It introduced a new element into their contract, and
added to it a warranty, which the law did not raise, nor the parties
intend it to contain. The parties negotiated on the basis of caveat
emptor, and contracted accordingly: see Whitmore v. South Boston
Iron Co., 2 Allen 52."
VIII.' SALE BY SAMPLE.

(a) Generalrule.
Another very important and common warranty, that the law
implies, is in a sale by sample, where the vendor warrants the mass
or bulk of the goods sold to be equal to the sample. This rule is
almost universal. See Hargous v. Stone, 1 Selden 73; Bradford
v. JManly, 13 Mass. 139; Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle (Penn.)
37; Leonard v. Fowler, 44 N. Y. 289; Brower v. Lewis, 19
Barb. (N. Y.) 574; Afagee v. Billingsley, 3 Ala. 679; Gallagher
v. Waring, 9 Wend. 20.
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In Pennsylvania, however, the existing rule seems to be different,
and the courts at present hold, that in a sale by sample, the vendor
is not bound to deliver, goods in bulk equal in quality to the sample
shown, but only goods of the same kind or species ; all gradations
in quality being at the risk of the purchaser.
Thus, in Fraley v. BispTan, 10 Penn. St. 320, where it
appeared that a sale of fifty hogsheads of superior sweet-scented
Kentucky leaf tobacco was made by sample, the court held that
the terms of the sale were satisfied by the delivery of Kentucky
leaf tobacco, not equal to the sample, but ill-flavored, rotten,
heated, unsaleable, and not sweet-scented. The same principle
was laid down in the recent case of Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Penn.
St. 319 (1877). Here, a corn broker effected a sale for A. of 850
cases of "king's brand" of canned corn to B., who had first
been furnished with a sample of three cans for trial, and had
found them in a good condition. After the delivery, the corn was
found to be greasy and sour, and part unfit for use. It was
proved that the only absolute test of the soundness of canned
corn, without opening the cans, is the swelling and bursting of
the cans. There were no swelled cans, and there was no evidence of fraud in the transaction. On a suit by the vendor on
a note given by the vendee, the court below held, "a sale by
sample is not a warranty," and a verdict and judgment were
entered for the plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.
SHARSWOOD, J., dissenting.

AGNEW, 0. J., in pronouncing the

opinion of the court, said: "If we trace the law of this statethrough the following cases, we shall find that a sale of chattels by
the production of a sample, but without fraud, or circumstances
to fix the character of the sample as a standard of quality, is not
attended by any implied warranty of the quality. The sample,
under such circumstances, pure and simple, becomes a guaranty
only that the articles to be delivered shall follow its kind and be
simply merchantable. These are the cases referred to: Borrektns
v. Bevan, 3"Rawle 23; 7ennings v. Gratz, Id. 168; Airk v. Nice,
2 Watts 367; MitcFarland v. Newman, 9 Id. 55; Fraley v.
Bispham, 10 Barr 320; Carson et al. v. Baillie, 7 Harris 375;
Wetherill v. Neilson, 8 Id. 448; .Eagen v. Call, 10 Casey 286;
Weirner v. Clement, I Wright 147; WMidtaker v. flastwiclk, 25
P. F. Smith 229. Such, precisely, was the state of this case. The
broker, going on a business round, produced a can of the corn, and
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exhibited it to the defendants, and they afterwards asked to see
others, which they opened and examined and proved by looking
for themselves. On the following day they made an offer for the
lot, which was accepted. There was no fraud and no warranty to
show that the parties dealt upon the basis of a quality to be precisely such as the cans exhibited contained. The evidence also
showed that such cans are hermetically sealed to preserve the corn,
and are thus bought and sold, and that the only true indication of
their being spoiled is the bulging of the cans produced by fermentation * * * which swell out the head. It is also shown that these
cans were not bulged. The court charged, if there were fraud in
the selection of the cans as a means of imposition, or they were
of a particular lot, and the seller delivered from a different lot, it
would be evidence of fraud. iBut the court saw no evidence in
the case of either fraud or warranty, and under these circumstances
charged that a sale by sample was not in itself a warranty of the
quality of the corn. This language is too broad for all cases, but
under these facts it seems to us there was no error in the instruction. It was said of a general sale without circumstances. The
seller did not agree or say that the remainder should be of the
same quality as the sample, and the purchaser did not order
the corn to be delivered to be of the same quality as the sample;
nothing was said or done on either side to give character to the
sample cans as a standard of the quality. This being the nature
of the sale, the sample became a standard only of the kind, and
the goods were simply merchantable. So long as the commodity
is saleable, ,its different degrees of quality from good to bad are not
the subject of an implied warranty; if it be wholly unmarketable,
such as cannot be considered merchantable, probably a different
conclusion would be reached, because an unmarketable article is
substantially different in kind from one that is saleable in themarket."
This decision has always, we believe, been looked upon by the.
Philadelphia bar. with great doubt, and it is also to be observed
that the learned jurist, Justice SHARSWOOD, the late Chief Justice
of the court, dissented, and WILLUAMS, J., was absent during
the argument.
(b) -Produetionof iSample not necessarily sale by Sample.
While a sale by sample usually constitutes a warranty, that the
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bulk of the article sold is equal to the sample, it must clearly
appear that the sale is in reality a sale by sample; for the mere
production of the sample is not always a sale by sample.
Thus in, Salisbury v. Stainer, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 159, it was
proved on the trial that defendants wrote plaintiffs a letter, to the
effect that "advices received from Trieste this morning by the
English packet, quote first quality Ferrara hemp, same as sold to
you;" that the hemp had been generally represented as of the first
quality; that plaintiff examined the hemp in person, by cutting
open one bale, being also told by defendants to examine well for
hirnself, and that he might so have examined all the hemp. It
was contended this was a sale by sample, from which it should be
inferred the bulk was equal to the sample. BRoNsoN, J., said:
" This was not a sale by sample; Salisbury was told to examine
and did examine the hemp for himself. He inspected the bales,
cut open one of them, and was at liberty to open others, had he
chosen to do so. If he was not satisfied of the quality and condition of the goods, he should either have proceeded to a further
examination or provided against a possible loss by requiring a
warranty."
In Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wallace (U. S.) 883, the facts of
which case are fully stated, supra, under head VII., of this article,
it was held by the court not to be a sale by sample, as the purchaser
had examined the goods, in part, and might have examined them all
if he had so desired. He bought on his own knowledge and at
his own risk.
In Ames v. Jones, 77 N. Y. 614, D. purchased from producers
in the vicinity of Napanee a lot of barley, and in so doing always
selected the best and rejected the inferior barley. Subsequently
he shipped the barley to Oswego, and the defendan's agent
visited the warehouse of D. and was shown a sample of barley,
which he took to New York and showed to defendant, who then
telegraphed to D. "will give one-twenty for your thirty thousand
choice Napanee barley afloat in N. Y. ;" who in turn replied, "will
accept, your offer of one-twenty-can give you ten thousand more
if you wish." This was the entire negotiation. D..was apparently
ignorant of the delivery of the sample to defendant.- In an action
for the price, defendants contended this was a sale by sample, and
the barley was inferior to the sample. Held, not a sale by sample.
See also, Day v. Baguet, 14 Minn. 273; Waring v. Mason, 18
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Wend. (N. Y.) 425; Jones v. Wasson, 59 Tenn. lep. 211;
Atwater v. Clancy, 107 Mass. 369.
In Beirne v. -Dord,1 Selden (N. Y.) 95, blankets in bales were
sold by the defendant to the plaintiff in the formei's shop. When
the purchase was made, defendant exhibited to the purchaser several
pairs of blankets, which were examined by him and were sound.
Nothing was said as to the rest, which it was possible but not convenient to examine. On delivery the blankets were found motheaten. Plaintiffs offered to prove the existence of a custom to
the effect that sales were usually made in this manner, and that it
was not customary to examine the bales at the sale, but if any
blankets turned out to be bad, they were either taken back, or an
allowance was made forthem to the purchaser, which evidence was
allowed on exception. The court charged the jury "the evidence
was not admitted for the purpose of proving a general usage of trade,
forming a part of the contract, or of itself establishing a sale by sample ; but it was received as an item of testimony tending to show, in
connection with other evidence, that a personal examination of the
bulk sold was never contemplated by either party, and that both
parties intended to contract upon the sample only, and to make
the testimony effective even to this extent, you must be satisfied
that there was a general usage in this trade, not merely to sell by
exhibiting a sample specimen, but to sell with a mutual understanding that the bulk should, be like the bulk in all respects." The
court, on appeal, held this charge to be error, on the ground that the
custom could not be admissible to -control the general rules of law
on the subject. In speaking of the dealing by sample in a sale,
JEWETT, J., explained the distinction between a sale by sample and
a sale where a sample is exhibited. "The mere circumstance,"
said he "that the seller exhibits a sample at the time of the sale,
will not of itself make it a sale by sample, so as to subject the
seller to liability on an implied warranty as to the nature and quality
of the goods; because it may be exhibited, not as a warranty- that
the bulk corresponds to it, but merely to enable the purchaser to
form a judgment on its kind and quality. If the contract be connected by the circumstances attending the sale, with the sample,
and refer to it and it be exhibited as the inducement to the contract, it may be a sale by sample; and then the consequence
follows, that the seller warrants the bulk of the goods to correspond
with the specimen exhibited as a sample. Whether a sale be a sale
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by sample or not, is a question of fact to find from the evidence in
each case; and to authorize a jury to find such a contract, the
evidence must satisfactorily show that the parties contracted
solely in reference to the sample exhibited. That they mutually
understood that they were dealing with the sample as an agreement
or understanding that the bulk, of the commodity corresponded with
it: or, in other words the evidence must be such as to authorize the
jury, under all the circumstances of the case, to find that the sale
was intended by the parties as a sale by sample. * * * That a
personal examination of the bulk of the goods by the purchaser
at the time of the sale is not practicable or convenient furnishes no
sufficient ground of itself to say that the sale is by sample. The
want of an opportunity, from whatever cause, for such an examination, is doubtless a strong fact in reference to the question of the
character of the sale, whether it is made by sample or not-but it
is nevertheless true, that a contract of sale by sample may be made
whether such examination be practicable or not, if the parties so
agree. Where the acts and declarations of the parties in making
-the contract for the sale of goods are 'of doubtful consti'uction,
evidence that it was impracticable or inconvenient to examine the
bulk of the goods would be proper, and in connection with evidence
of other circumstances attending the transaction might aid in coming to a correct conclusion in respect to the true character of the
contract."
(c) Implied warranty of merchantabili in a sale by Sample.
Where there is an express warranty this, as a general rule,
excludes any idea of an implied warranty.
Thus in Lanier v. Auld's Ad'mr, 1 Murphy (N. C.) 188,
where the writing in evidence showed that defendant had made a
warranty as to the age and soundness of a negro slave, in a sale to
the plaintiff, the court held, that this fact excluded any idea of an
implied warranty: "We are of opinion that the law will not imply
what is not expressed, where there is a formal contract. Evans's
Essays 321; Forbes 361; Doug. 654, 6 Term Rep. 606. The
express warranty as to soundness and age excludes any implied
warranty as to other qualities."
So in Deming v. Foster, 42 N. H. 165, where there was a sale
of oxen, warranted sound and all right, and which both parties
knew were intended for farm work, the court held, inter alia, there
was no implied warranty of fitness for farm work. BELL, 0. J.

